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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are growing fast in number, while multilateral
trade negotiations are stalling. From 1995 through 2010, the number of PTAs in-
creased fourfold to reach 300 PTAs presently in force (WTO, 2011); the geographical
coverage of PTAs has expanded both within and between continents, and with the
participation of developed and developing countries. At the same time, negotiations
to open trade multilaterally have not made signiﬁcant progress in recent years.
Given the non-optimality of preferential trade liberalization, and the distorsions
associated to it, these facts are worrying. They raise the question of why coun-
tries favor discriminatory trade opening, when theory suggests a unilateral and non-
discriminatory opening of trade to be optimal. We examine this question by looking
at the immediate gains countries may expect from alternative trade policies. These
gains are of two types: market access gains, which translate into higher production
prices, and real income gains, which beneﬁt consumers by lowering the domestic
price index. Our results show that the former are a stronger determinant of trade
policy than the latter.
Our approach consists in letting the data on trade policies talk about what guides
countries' decisions. We use an exhaustive database of tariﬀ protection for the period
2001-2007, and rely on a simple Armington model of international trade to compute
the implied changes in trade and real income for world countries.
First, we characterize each country's trade policy in our period of interest, mea-
suring the impacts of its policy all else equal. We ask in particular if these trade
policies tend to reinforce distorsions in the trade structure of countries, by making
trade more preferential. Results show disparities across countries: about half the
countries in our sample have had a policy which made their trade more multilateral,
all else equal. This runs counter to the intuition that the overwhelming trend in re-
cent years has been toward more preferentialism, as suggested by the multiplication
of PTAs. Rather, our analysis suggests that some countries tend to favor one or the
other modes of liberalization, depending on the relative gains they expect from each
process.
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This observation naturally leads us to ask about the determinants of trade policy
choices of countries. What explains that countries choose to engage in PTAs, or to
open trade in a non-preferential manner? Previous literature has emphasized that
the choice of trade policy results from confronting diﬀerent interests (Grossman and
Helpman, 1995): producers in diﬀerent sectors tend to favor or oppose an agreement
depending on the structure of protection and productivity diﬀerences between po-
tential partners, causing them to expect market access gains, or increased import
competition. Consumers expect real income gains through lower prices, however
they may also expect losses by diversion if distorsions in the tariﬀ structure become
important. Computing the impacts of alternative trade policy choices for produc-
ers and for consumers, we confront these impacts with the list of actually signed
agreements. Results indicate that expected real income gains from signing a PTA
predict those agreements that were actually signed; moreover, potential gains from
multilateral opening reduce the probability of signing, which conﬁrms the existence
of a tradeoﬀ between the two modes of liberalization. However, we also ﬁnd that
the two gains do not carry the same weight in a country's trade policy: gains in
production prices have an impact that is about two times larger on the probability
of signing.
Finally, we also show that the losses by diversion faced by countries are also a
signiﬁcant predictor of the signing of PTAs, which conﬁrms a contagion or domino
eﬀect (Baldwin, 1993) being one of the main forces behind the proliferation of PTAs.
In other words, countries sign PTAs also for the motive of avoiding the losses from
non-preferential access to a partner's market.
Our approach focuses on terms-of-trade impacts of trade policy. By using a multi-
sector, endowment model of international trade with Armington diﬀerentiation, we
restrict the analysis to the short-term eﬀects of trade barrier changes, leaving aside
longer-term eﬀects through adjustments of the production structure or technology
improvements. Previous literature has shown these terms-of-trade motives to be
predominant in driving trade policy (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). Our results
conﬁrm this aspect, and more importantly, show that structural estimates of terms-
of-trade have explanatory power for trade policy, above and beyond proxies based
3
on distance and income levels. The use of the Armington endowments model is also
justiﬁed by its good performance to explain trade data (Anderson and Yotov, 2010b,
2012).
We ﬁrst present the model and its relation to other models belonging to the
structural gravity class. We then analyze in a simple example how the impact of
preferential tariﬀ reductions on prices and real income varies with the trade elas-
ticity, the relative size of trading partners and pre-FTA trade patterns. Then, we
parameterize the model to quantify PTA eﬀects, which boils down to estimating
sector-level trade elasticities. This parameter is crucial as it is a suﬃcient statistic
which allows to predict the adjustment of trade and prices to trade policy shocks,
in structural gravity models. We estimate these parameters using disaggregated
bilateral applied tariﬀ panel data, which allows to control for the endogeneity of
trade policy through the use of country-sector ﬁxed eﬀects (Baier and Bergstrand,
2007). Once armed with these elasticity estimates and with our data on applied tar-
iﬀ changes, we compute PTA eﬀects by counterfactual estimation. This allows us to
compute the trade and real income impacts implied trade policies as implemented by
world countries during the period. Then, we use the method to confront the eﬀects
of actual trade policies to those of alternative policies, namely trade agreements and
multilateral trade liberalizations.
A large literature has studied the determinants of trade policy. The seminal
paper by Grossman and Helpman (1995) builds a political economy framework where
governments take into account both voter's interests and industry special interests
in deciding over trade agreements. By contrast, we do not enter into the political
economy structure of countries, as we do not observe whether groups are organized
into lobbies, nor whether there is coordination across sectors in trying to inﬂuence
trade policy. Rather, we make the implicit hypothesis that net gains to each group,
aggregated across sectors, should matter for the government's decisions. This should
be the case if the possibility of transfers across groups exists, so that adversely
impacted groups can be compensated for their losses. Our results indicate that this
is the case only in part. Our results are also related to those in Goldberg and Maggi
(1999), who run an empirical test of the model by Grossman (1994). These authors
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quantify the weight of welfare in the US government's objective function and ﬁnd
it to be very close to 1 (0.99), implying that the US government is close to being a
perfect welfare maximizer in its design of tariﬀ structure. By contrast, our analysis
based on the signing of PTAs ﬁnds robust evidence that world countries' trade
policies substantially diﬀer from the welfare-maximizing, overweighting producers'
interests over those of consumers.
The use of an endowments model of trade based on Armington diﬀerentiation
and Dixit- Stiglitz preferences places our paper in the so-called structural gravity
literature (Anderson and Yotov, 2011; Egger et al., 2011)). It has been recognized
that diﬀerent one-sector models of trade, based on CES preferences, such as Krug-
man (1979); Eaton and Kortum (2002); Melitz (2003) have in common to generate
a gravity equation with a similar structure for trade ﬂows. One consequence is that
these models generate the same functional form for the impacts of trade cost changes
on prices and real income levels, conditional on trade elasticities and on initial trade
levels (Arkolakis et al., 2012). Thus, estimating trade elasticities becomes the key to
predict price movements in these models, as this parameter encompasses the diﬀer-
ent margins of adjustment described in these models. This motivates our approach,
which consists in estimating sector-level trade elasticities, in order to compute the
impacts of various trade policy scenarios on price and real income levels. The valid-
ity of these results beyond the Armington model will be discussed in detail in the
text.
In addition, relying on sector-level elasticity estimates instead of a single PTA
parameter allows us to account for heterogeneity in PTA eﬀects due to the width
and depth of tariﬀ reductions.1
Finally, by assuming ﬁxed endowments the model features an inelastic export
supply curve, similarly to models of terms-of-trade manipulation and optimal tariﬀs
(Broda, Limao and Weinstein, 2008, Ludema and Mayda, 2011). Therefore, as
in these models, there is a positive association between market power and tariﬀs:
1Another diﬀerence is that we solve the model in full general equilibrium, allowing for export
prices to aﬀect trade through countries' income, contrary to antecedents in which trade changes
are computed while implicitly keeping countries' income as ﬁxed (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003;
Anderson and Yotov, 2010a; Baier and Bergstrand, 2009; Egger et al., 2011).
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countries have an incentive to set higher tariﬀs on imports from partner countries in
which their market share is higher, while opening trade in priority with those where
their market power is lower.2
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section (2), we present the model, and
discuss its relation to the class of structural gravity models, and the possible gener-
alization of our results in this framework. We then use a simple, 3-country version
of the model to analyze its implications for the eﬀects of PTAs on trade, real income
and welfare. In section (4), we estimate the trade elasticities. In section (5), we
compute the price and real income impacts of trade policy implemented by world
countries during our period of study. Then, in section (6), we study the determinants
of the signing of PTAs. Section (7) concludes.
2 Model
This section presents the multi-sector Armington model, and the method used to
calibrate it and to solve it in comparative statics simulation exercises. We then
discuss the relationship between this model and other models of trade featuring
additional margins of adjustment to trade cost changes, such as the Krugman (1979),
Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003) models. We make the point that the
changes in prices and real income levels which we compute in our model can, under
some conditions, be generalized to these richer frameworks.
Model structure
The model features multiple sectors, covering agriculture, mining and manufacturing
activities.3 We model preferences with a Cobb-Douglas structure across sectors and
CES (constant elasticity of substitution) across varieties within each sector. Goods
in each sector k are produced using a speciﬁc factor, of which each country i has a
2However, contrary to those models, there is no optimal positive tariﬀ, because the gain to
consumers always dominates over losses to domestic producers. This is due to the hypothesis of
imperfect substitution between domestic and imported goods. Thus, issues related to negotiations
over tariﬀs are not considered here.
3In the empirical application, each sector corresponds to one code in revision 3 of the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC), maintained by the UN.
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ﬁxed endowment Lik. Within each sector, we make the Armington assumption that
goods are diﬀerentiated by country of origin (consumers perceive varieties produced
in diﬀerent countries as imperfect substitutes).
Demand is thus given by:
ckij = (p
k
i )
−σk .
(
τ kij
P kj
)1−σk
.Ekj , (1)
where ckij is the demand of country j's consumers for the i variety of good k, p
k
i is
the f.o.b (free on board) price of that variety, τ kij is the iceberg trade cost on trade
from i to j in sector k (which is to include geographic and trade policy components
of trade costs), P kj is country j's price index in that sector and σk is the elasticity of
substitution between varieties of that good. Ekj is country j's expenditure on good k,
given by Ekj = αk.Yj, where αk is the Cobb-Douglas parameter share of expenditure
on good k and Yj is country j's total income4.
Sectors are thus modeled as largely independent in the model: labor cannot be
reallocated across sectors, and consumers spend a ﬁxed share of their expenditure
on each sector (Cobb-Douglas assumption)5. We thus abstract from factor-based
comparative advantage eﬀects, as well as from inter-sectoral linkages (e.g. vertical
relations). One reason for doing this is that, as documented below, results on price
responses to trade cost changes in the one-sector Armington model are, under some
conditions, valid under a larger class of one-sector models. This is still true of
price responses in each sector of our model, which functions like a superposition of
one-sector Armington models. This restrictive assumption allows to estimate price
responses to trade policy changes using a limited list of statistics (trade elasticity,
trade levels, tariﬀ changes); which would not be possible if accounting for inter-
sectoral linkages.
4Note: parameters of the demand function αk and σk are assumed to be identical across coun-
tries.
5This modeling choice is motivated by the fact that our sectors (as deﬁned by ISIC codes) are
suﬃciently distinct to allow little substitution.
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The nominal bilateral trade ﬂow between i and j in sector k is given by
Xkij =
(
pki .τ
k
ij
P kj
)1−σk
.Ekj . (2)
with P kj the ideal price index for j's consumers in country k, given by:
(P kj )
(1−σk) =
∑
i
(pki .τ
k
ij)
1−σk . (3)
A quantity Qki of good k is produced by a representative ﬁrm in country i, using
a speciﬁc factor Lki which is in ﬁxed supply. Without loss of generality, one can set
the factor requirement to 1, which yields identity between sector-level wages wki and
the f.o.b. price of the good:
wki = p
k
i (4)
The market clearing condition for each variety of each good is written as:
∑
j
Xkij = p
k
i .Q
k
i , (5)
where the sum is over all destinations, including domestic sales of the good.
Finally, each country's total income Yj is equal to the total value of sales in all
sectors:
Yj =
∑
k
pkj .Q
k
j (6)
The structural gravity equation
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) deﬁne the aggregate of demand-weighted trade costs
faced by an exporter as the exporter's `multilateral resistance'. This multilateral
price (we use here both terms interchangeably) is deﬁned as:
(Πki )
1−σk =
∑
j
(
τ kij
P kj
)1−σk Ekj
Y kw
, (7)
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where Y kw is the total nominal value of world production of good k: Y
k
w =
∑
i p
k
iQ
k
i .
Using this deﬁnition and equation 5, one obtains the relationship between f.o.b prices
and multilateral resistance terms as:
(pki )
σk =
Y kw
Qki
.(Πki )
1−σk . (8)
Combining this expression with the trade demand equation 2, one obtains the
gravity equation for nominal trade ﬂows:
Xkij =
(
τ kij
P kj Π
k
i
)1−σk
.
Ekj Y
k
i
Y kw
. (9)
which expresses bilateral trade as a function of bilateral trade costs, multilateral
prices (Πki ) and (P
k
j ) (labeled exporter and importer multilateral resistance terms,
respectively, by Anderson and Wincoop (2003)), and the income and expenditure
levels of the exporter and importer, Ekj and Y
k
i .
One advantage of this expression is that its structure is common to distinct
trade models. More precisely, trade models such as Krugman (1979), Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003), all yield a gravity equation for trade, where
bilateral trade ﬂows are a constant-elasticity function of bilateral trade costs and of
multilateral price terms for the exporting and importing countries. Across models,
the trade elasticity (equal to 1 − σk in the case considered here) will depend on
diﬀerent parameters of the model.6
Thus, the trade elasticity can be estimated using equation 9, using a measure of
time-varying bilateral trade costs and country-sector ﬁxed eﬀects which control for
the exporter and importer terms P kj and E
k
j , Π
k
i and Y
k
i . This obtained estimate
of the trade elasticities, σˆk, should thus be viewed not as speciﬁc to the Armington
used here, but valid under more general assumptions which are compatible with the
structural gravity equation.
In turn, the relative price changes in response to trade cost changes, are also
6For example, in the Armington model used here, as in the Krugman (1979) model, it is simply
a function of the CES elasticity of substitution. In Eaton and Kortum (2002) and in Melitz
(2003), it depends on the CES elasticity and on the parameter governing the distribution of ﬁrms
productivities.
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invariant across a class of models, conditional on the value of trade elasticities and
initial trade values. This motivates our empirical strategy: we ﬁrst estimate sector-
level trade elasticities, then compute price and income changes resulting from trade
cost changes (preferential agreements), in a comparative statics exercise whose va-
lidity extends beyond the Armington model. This result is discussed in the section
2.1.
Resolution method Once estimates of the trade elasticities for each sector are
obtained (section 4), the comparative statics exercises in sections 5 and 6 are carried
by solving the model ﬁrst in the reference year 2001 with data for applied tariﬀs in
that year and total production by country and sector7; then in alternative scenarios
where changes in tariﬀs are applied, while production values and non-tariﬀ com-
ponents of trade costs are maintained constant. For each set of tariﬀ values, the
model is solved using an iteration algorithm. Equations 8, 3 and 6 are solved in
the variables pki , P
k
j and Yj, iterating until the relative error in each component of
the equations is lower than 0.1%. The system admits a unique equilibrium once a
normalization is imposed: we set Yw =
∑
j Yj = 1.
In each scenario, changes in prices and income levels are then measured as the
relative change between the equilibrium in benchmark year 2001 and the new equi-
librium after tariﬀ changes are applied.
2.1 Validity of our results in more complex models
Results for relative price changes in response to trade cost changes, obtained in the
Armington model presented above can be generalized to a broader class of models
of trade. The basic intuition behind this result is that a number of one-sector
models of trade generate trade equations with the same gravity structure for the
trade equation, where the trade elasticity - the elasticity of trade with respect to
trade costs and wages - is a function of diﬀerent parameters of the model, reﬂecting
diﬀerent margins of adjustment to trade shocks.
In turn, changes in the f.o.b. prices of variety and the ideal price index in each
7See section 4 for details on the data used.
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country, resulting from a change in trade costs, will be driven by the constant-
elasticity dependence of trade to prices. Thus, the relative changes in prices, con-
ditional on the trade elasticity (as well as on initial trade levels) will be unchanged
across these models. Note that this does not imply equivalence across these models,
but rather, that the trade elasticity is a suﬃcient statistic to compute a number of
price changes.
Arkolakis et al. (2012) present a set of conditions deﬁning a class of models
where this result holds. These include the Krugman (1980) model of trade with
symmetric ﬁrms in monopolistic competition in each country; the Eaton and Kortum
(2002) model of Ricardian comparative advantage, and the Melitz (2003) model with
heterogeneity in ﬁrm productivity.
The three required macro-level restrictions are: that trade is balanced; that
the share of proﬁts in a country's total revenues is constant; and that the import
demand system is of the form:
Xij =
ξij.Ni.(wiτij)
. Yj∑′
i ξi′j.N
′
i .(w
′
iτi′j)

(10)
where Xij is trade value from country i to j, Ni is the number of ﬁrms operating
in country i, ξij is a function of parameters distinct from τ ; Yj is country j's income
level; and  is the trade elasticity, which is a function of diﬀerent parameters in
diﬀerent models 8
It is relatively straightforward to show that this set of conditions leads to the
following system of equations:
wˆi =
∑
l
λilwˆlYl(wˆiτˆil)

Yi
∑
r λrl(wˆrτˆrl)
(11)
and
8Condition 10 is called R3' in Arkolakis et al. (2012) and is more restrictive than condition
R3 under which their most central result on the welfare gains from trade is derived. This central
result states that welfare change from a shock to trade costs, conditional on the change in import
penetration, is constant across a class of models. This does not mean that these models generate
the same welfare changes from a given trade policy shock, as the import penetration reaction can
diﬀer across models. Thus, in order to derive the stronger result, of interest to us, that relative
price changes, for a given shock on trade costs, are invariant, condition R3' is necessary.
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Pˆj = [
∑
i
λij(wˆiτˆij)
]−1/ (12)
where zˆ denotes the ratio of ﬁnal to initial value of variable z, z′/z, resulting
from a arbitrary change in trade costs; and λij =
Xij
Ej
is the initial share of imports
from i in country j's total expenditure.
This system deﬁnes the relative change in wages wˆi as an implicit function of
initial trade shares and relative changes in trade costs.
Our Armington model of trade veriﬁes these assumptions: trade is balanced;
proﬁts are zero, due to the hypothesis of perfect competition; and trade ﬂows are
given by the expression 10, with the number of ﬁrms and the parameter ξ being
uniformly one; and  = 1− σ, with σ our CES elasticity of substitution.
This ensures that the relative changes in wages (or equivalently, f.o.b. prices) wˆi
and in the consumption price index Pˆj are given by conditions 11 and 12, in this
class of models, and thus that these changes, conditional on trade elasticities and
trade shares, are invariant across these models.
These models include some of the models often used in the trade literature.
One important common characteristic of these models is that they assume CES
preferences9. In particular, this implies that markups will be constant: pro- or
anti-competitive eﬀects of trade openness are thus not accounted for.10
3 Impact of a PTA on prices: a simple example
In this section, we use a simple example with a three-country, one-sector version of
the Armington model, to illustrate the impacts of preferential trade liberalization
on production prices and real income in this model.
We consider the following stylized model with three countries denoted A, B and
C, producing and trading diﬀerentiated varieties of the same one good. We assume
9In principle, condition 10 does not imply that preferences are CES, as this condition charac-
terizes the import demand function as a result of both preferences and supply side responses. In
practice, commonly used models verifying 10 all assume CES preferences.
10See e.g. Neary and Mrazova (2013) for a discussion of the relation between demand elasticities
and pro-competitive eﬀects in a more general framework.
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that A is at an equal distance from B and C, with a larger distance between B and
C. In practice, we set initial trade costs as:
τij = 1 if i = j
τAB = τAC = 1.5
τBC = 2
tradecostij = (1 + AV ij).τij (13)
where AV is the ad-valorem equivalent of trade policy barriers applied by j
on imports from i. That is, bilateral trade costs result from a combination of a
geographical component and of policy barriers applied by countries.11
We initially set the size of countries A, B, C to 1, 10 and 5; a country's size being
here equal to its labor endowment, or equivalently to the volume of its production.
We assume that countries initially apply a MFN, non-discriminatory tariﬀ to all
imports, and set it to 30%. We consider the case of a bilateral PTA signed between
countries A and B, which sets tariﬀs between these two countries to 0.
We focus on the impact of the PTA on prices in country A. The questions of
interest to us, here and in the rest of the paper, are the impact of the PTA on the
producer price pA; the consumer price index PA; and the country's real income YA =
pA.QA
PA
.12
Figure 1 represents the relative change in production price pA: we have here two
parameters varying, the size of the partner country B, which goes from 1 to 20; and
the elasticity of substitution σ, which varies between 1 and 10.
The ﬁgure shows that the impact of the PTA on production price changes sign
11This is similar to the functional form which will be used to model trade costs in the empirical
part, where the geographic component will account in particular for distance and contiguity.
12In the case of policy barriers being in the form of tariﬀs, the real income of a country includes
the share of revenues from trade barriers which is rebated:YA =
pA.QA+ρ.
∑
i=B,C
AViXiA
PA
with ρ the
share of revenue rebated. We will check that modifying ρ does not modify qualitatively our results.
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depending on these two parameters. In particular, in the low substitution case,
the impact is positive, while it becomes mostly negative in the high-σ region. This
reﬂects two competing eﬀects: on one hand, the PTA grants preferential access to
country B's market, which allows A's producers to raise their production price, the
more so, the more inelastic the demand for their variety is. On the other hand, the
PTA entails reciprocal tariﬀ reductions, which implies a competition eﬀect on A's
domestic market: this tends to bring the price of A's variety lower, with this eﬀect
being larger if competing varieties from A and B are more substitutable.
These two eﬀects are generally larger when the size of the partner country in-
creases. Thus, in a low-σ sector, one would expect producers in country A to prefer a
PTA with a large partner (all else equal); while in a high-σ where import competition
dominates, they would prefer a PTA with a smaller partner country.
Figure 2 displays the impact of the PTA on country A's consumer price index
(the CES ideal price index). The impact is negative as the PTA lowers the aggregate
price of consumption in the country; it is displayed in absolute value here. The ﬁgure
shows that consumers stand to gain from the PTA, the more so when σ is low and
the size of the partner country increases. Interestingly, the gradient of the impact
is not aligned with that of the production price impact: for example, in the high-σ
region, the gain increases with the partner's size, while the impact on production
price becomes more negative. This illustrates the divergence of interests in trade
policy: in a country trading a good with high trade elasticity, a policy focused on
maximizing production prices would prefer a PTA with a small partner country,
while favoring the gains to consumers would lead to choose a PTA with a large
country.
Figure 3 displays the impact of the PTA on country A's real income. It shows
that the larger gains in real income are obtained in the high-σ, high-Q region. The
PTA lowers the consumer price index in country A, through cheaper imports from
partner country B and through the import competition eﬀect, which also lowers the
domestic variety's price. These eﬀects are larger in the high-σ region and dominate
the negative impact on domestic prices, causing a larger real income gain. This
illustrates the divergence between the objectives of maximizing production prices
14
versus real income.
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Figure 1: PTA impact on country A's production price
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Figure 2: PTA impact on country A's consumer price index
Another example of this divergence is given on ﬁgure 4, which focuses on changes
in production prices and in the consumer price index, in the case σ = 8, as a function
of the partner country's size Q. The ﬁgure highlights the non-linearities in price
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Figure 3: PTA impact on country A's real income
changes in this model and shows that the maxima of the two price functions do not
coincide.
This highlights again the divergence between the two objectives: assuming that a
country would face the alternative of signing a PTA with two countries diﬀering only
by their size, the optimal choice would diﬀer depending on whether policymakers
favor the objective of maximizing production prices, or consumers' real income level.
The rest of the paper will attempt to use the information on the PTAs signed
by world countries as indicative of the underlying objective pursued by signing gov-
ernments. The same Armington model, but with more countries, multiple sectors
will be used. Variations in initial trade level and sectoral composition, distance to
potential PTA partners and third countries, will generate variations in the potential
impact of a PTA on signing countries' production prices and real income. Our ap-
proach consists in confronting these impacts to the observed choice of PTAs to infer
information on the objective functions governing trade policy choices.
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4 Estimation of sector elasticities
Empirical speciﬁcation The estimation of the eﬀects of PTAs is done in two
steps. In this section we estimate elasticities of substitution at sector level to
parametrize the model. Next we estimate the eﬀects of trade policy changes. Taking
the log of equation (9) yields
lnXkij = ln
Y ki
Y kW
+ ln
Ekj
Y kW
+ (1− σk).(ln τ kij − ln(P kj .Πki )). (14)
A functional form of trade costs is needed to estimate this equation. In line with
the common practice in the literature, we assume the following log-linear stochastic
form:
τ kij = (1 + Tariﬀ
k
ij).d
ρk
ij .e
αkContigij .eβ
kComlangij .eu
k
ij , (15)
where Tariﬀkij is the ad-valorem equivalent of tariﬀ barriers on i's products exported
to j in sector k, dij is the distance between i and j and ukij represent unobserved
bilateral trade cost determinants. We also add two dummy variables: Contigij,
which is unity if countries/regions i and j are contiguous, and Comlangij, which is
unity if i and j share an oﬃcial language.
Plugging the functional form of trade costs into (14) and adding time subscripts
to stress the point that some of the variables are time varying give us:
lnXkijt = ln
Y kit
Y kWt
+ ln
Ekjt
Y kWt
+ (1− σk).(ln(1 + Tarifkijt)− ln(P kjt)− ln(Πkit))
+ (1− σk).(ρk.dij + αContigij + βComlangij) + kijt, (16)
where kijt is the stochastic error term. We estimate this equation separately for
each sector. We introduce exporter-time (λit) and importer-time (λjt) ﬁxed eﬀects,
which enables us to control fully for unobserved sector-level country shares of world
production and expenditure, as well as for country multilateral price terms for each
sector. Thus our speciﬁcation is the following:
lnXkijt = β
k ln(1+Tariﬀkijt)+γ
k ln dij+δ
kContigij+η
kComlangij+λit+λjt+
k
ijt. (17)
18
In this equation, coeﬃcient βk gives us directly the estimate of (1− σk), while γ
gives us the estimate of the product (1− σk).ρk, of which we can deduce ρ; we can
similarly obtain the eﬀects of contiguity and common language on trade costs.
Data We estimate the sector-level gravity equation using nominal bilateral trade
values from the BACI trade database.13 Trade data at product Harmonized System
(HS)-6 digit level are aggregated at the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁ-
cation (ISIC) rev.2 level (79 sectors). We see this level of aggregation as consistent
with the deﬁnition of sectors in the model.14 All world trade is considered, aggre-
gating ﬂows into 68 countries/regions to keep the model tractable. This estimation
strategy, which reduces the high dimensionality of data, is common in the literature
(see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 and Anderson and Yotov, 2010).
Data on distance, contiguity and languages are taken from the distance CEPII
database.15 Tariﬀ data are obtained from the CEPII MacMap database (Bouet et
al., 2008). This data set contains data on bilateral applied tariﬀ protection for the
years 2001, 2004 and 2007. Data on ad-valorem and speciﬁc tariﬀs, and on tariﬀ
quotas, are converted into ad-valorem equivalents using unit values data for the
year 2001. Thus, our tariﬀ variable is a comprehensive measure of applied tariﬀ
protection, which enables us to track changes in tariﬀ protection due to preferential
agreements.16 Importantly, this enables us to observe precisely the content of PTAs,
and to observe variations across PTAs in sector coverage, extent of tariﬀ reductions
and time period of implementation.17 Note that running our estimates on three-year
intervals allows us to obtain stable estimates, while the use of yearly data has been
shown to yield unstable gravity estimates, due to delays in the adjustment to trade
13The BACI trade data set is built by the CEPII (see www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.
htm).
14Recall that the model assumes a Cobb-Douglas structure of demand over sectors. Estimating
the model at a product level (e.g. HS-6 classiﬁcation) would thus implicitly impose a substitution
elasticity of 1 over HS-6 products, while the ﬁne level of detail of this classiﬁcation implies that
this elasticity is certainly higher.
15See http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
16Tariﬀ values at product level are aggregated at the level of ISIC-sectors using the `Regions of
Reference' method, thus weighting tariﬀ lines by trade values for the region to which the importer
belongs. This mitigates biases in simple trade-weighted aggregates. For more on this see Bouet et
al. (2008).
17Note that we also observe changes in applied tariﬀs which occur outside the framework of
PTAs.
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shocks (Olivero and Yotov, 2012). This also allows to ﬁlter out business cycle eﬀects.
In estimating equation (17), we face the problem of endogeneity of trade policy,
here of the tariﬀ variable. However, this problem is signiﬁcantly reduced by the
use of detailed tariﬀ data, instead of aggregate trade policy indicators such as PTA
dummies. Indeed, tariﬀ data at sector level oﬀer considerably more variation. We
exploit the fact that trade policy is decided at aggregate level (through multilateral
and preferential agreements) so that most tariﬀ changes at sector level can be seen
as exogenous from the point of view of the industry.18 This variation comes from
diﬀerences (1) in initial pre-PTA tariﬀ level; (2) in coverage of PTAs (that implement
partial reduction of tariﬀs across products); and (3) in implementation of tariﬀ
reductions over time.
Note also that our use of detailed tariﬀ data allows for a more direct estimation
of elasticities, in contrast to studies focusing on the eﬀect of distance or borders on
trade (see e.g. Anderson and Yotov, 2011, Hummels, 1999). Here sector elasticities
are directly obtained from the coeﬃcients on tariﬀ variables (the coeﬃcients are
1− σk), so that the knowledge of the elasticity of trade costs to distance and other
variables is not needed.
Estimation method We use an Ordinary Least Squares estimator with Country-
Year Fixed Eﬀects (OLS-CYFE) to estimate the 72 sector-level elasticities. The
country-year ﬁxed eﬀects (λit and λjt) control fully for importer and exporter time-
varying variables: import price indices, exporter f.o.b prices, exporter and importer
shares of production and expenditure demand in world total; and any other omitted
variable such as those related to institutions.
Results. Table (8) in appendix A displays the estimation results. The table dis-
plays the value of the tariﬀ coeﬃcient (corresponding to 1 − σk in the model), the
associated standard error and the number of observations used for the estimation.
Consistently with the CES preferences in our model, which imply that σk ≥ 1 in all
sectors, we ﬁnd negative coeﬃcients in all sectors.
18Note that this is true in particular for manufacturing sectors which are considered here, given
that all trade agreements considered apply a quasi-total tariﬀ dismantlement in manufacturing.
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The values we obtain are in the range [1,20; 13.9], with a mean value at 5.37.
This is consistent with estimates from other studies; for instance, the Feenstra (1994)
method applied to 56 ISIC sectors yields estimates ranging from 3.1 to 28, with mean
6.7 (Imbs and Mejean, 2009).
An additional check of the consistency of our sector-level estimates consists in
comparing our results with the classiﬁcation of traded goods in homogeneous versus
diﬀerentiated goods, proposed by Rauch (1999). Indeed, the elasticity of substi-
tution σk is in average 3.69 higher among homogeneous sectors than among the
diﬀerentiated ones 19
19Our ISIC rev.2 sectors are classiﬁed as homogeneous if they contain more SITC products
classiﬁed as homogenous than diﬀerentiated.
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5 Price and real income impacts of PTAs, 2001-2007
Armed with our estimates of the parameters of the model, we start in this section
by estimating the impact, on production prices and real income levels, of the trade
policy that was implemented by world countries during the 2001-2007 period. In
the next section, we will estimate the impacts of alternative trade policies.
5.1 Price impacts of PTAs
First, we ask whether PTAs beneﬁt at all to countries which sign them. Theoretical
insights have shown that a country may face a loss from distortions created in
import prices, so that a preferential trade opening may in some cases be detrimental
to domestic welfare. We use our model and data on tariﬀ protection changes for
the 2001-2007 period to compute the implied impacts of PTAs active in this period,
looking at changes in real income of signing countries.
Recall that this exercise gives us a lower bound estimate of the total eﬀect of
preferential liberalization on real income, as these estimates only take into account
the changes in tariﬀ barriers implemented by PTA partners. Moreover, the model
focuses on the eﬀects of changing terms-of-trade, while additional potential gains
through changes in specialization and productivity improvements are not taken into
account.
Second, we decompose those changes in real income into two components: pro-
duction prices and the consumption price index.20
This decomposition aims to distinguish the two sources of beneﬁts from PTAs: on
one hand, it lowers import prices, as well as domestic prices through the competition
eﬀect. This beneﬁts consumers in the country, by raising their income in real terms.
On the other hand, reciprocal tariﬀ reductions in the partner country increases access
to this market, which allows domestic producers to raise their mill price.
Tables 1 and 2 display the results of this exercise for the list of all active agree-
20Production prices and the consumption price index are aggregated across sectors. The aggre-
gate production price is the average of sector prices weighted by the sector share in total production
value. The aggregate ideal price index is the Cobb-Douglas aggregate of sector-level CES price
indices.
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ments during the period.21
These results show a large variation in the real income impacts of PTAs and in
the distribution of these impacts across agents within partner countries. Consumer
gains - in the form of a reduction of the domestic price index - vary between -0.82
and 2.2%. Producer gains - increased market access, allowing a rise in production
prices - vary between -0.15 and 1.56%. The amplitude of the price impacts of PTAs
is varying with trade shares between partners, trade composition, pre-agreement
tariﬀ levels, and with the magnitude of tariﬀ reductions. In particular, section 3
illustrates how the trade elasticity and the relative size of trade partners modify the
price impacts.
21We use the data for the list of signed PTAs which is maintained by José de Sousa,
http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm. Among all PTAs which were signed up to 2007, we con-
sider as active during the period 2001-2007, those for which the average tariﬀ decrease in that
period exceeded 10%. This allows to put aside those where most of the tariﬀ dimanstlement took
place out of our time window.
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Table 1: Price and real income impacts of PTAs (%), 2001-2007
Country Partner Import prices s.d. Production prices s.d. Real income s.d.
Algeria Egypt -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Algeria EU -1.53 0.06 -0.02 0.02 1.51 0.05
Argentina Brazil -0.18 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.35 0.02
Argentina Bolivia -0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.01
Argentina Chile -0.53 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.76 0.06
Bolivia Paraguay -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.01
Bolivia Uruguay -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01
Bolivia Argentina -0.53 0.05 0.37 0.07 0.90 0.05
Bolivia Brazil -0.63 0.04 0.37 0.04 1.00 0.06
Bolivia Mexico -0.45 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.50 0.02
Brazil Bolivia -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.01
Brazil Uruguay -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Brazil Argentina -0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.16 0.01
Brazil Chile -0.07 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.01
Chile Uruguay -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.02
Chile Brazil -0.16 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.33 0.03
Chile Korea -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.02
Chile Argentina -0.56 0.05 0.54 0.05 1.10 0.09
Chile China -0.12 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.19 0.03
Chile EFTA -0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02
Chile EU -1.06 0.03 -0.01 0.04 1.05 0.05
Chile USA -1.07 0.04 -0.02 0.02 1.04 0.05
China Chile -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
China Indonesia -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01
China Malaysia -0.08 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.03
China Thailand -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01
China Hong-Kong -0.43 0.04 -0.15 0.02 0.28 0.03
Colombia Mexico -0.63 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.68 0.02
EFTA Chile 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
EFTA Turkey -0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03
EU Chile 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
EU Egypt 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
EU Algeria 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Egypt Ghana -0.06 0.28 -0.02 0.09 0.05 0.20
Egypt Algeria -0.07 0.28 -0.02 0.09 0.05 0.20
Egypt South Africa -0.09 0.30 -0.03 0.09 0.07 0.21
Egypt Morocco -0.13 0.32 -0.02 0.10 0.11 0.23
Egypt Lebanon -0.15 0.29 -0.03 0.09 0.12 0.20
Egypt Tunisia -0.18 0.33 -0.01 0.10 0.17 0.24
Egypt Syria -0.16 0.30 -0.06 0.09 0.10 0.21
Egypt Jordan -0.20 0.30 -0.03 0.09 0.16 0.22
Egypt Turkey -0.28 0.33 -0.05 0.10 0.22 0.24
Egypt EU -2.21 0.38 -0.15 0.11 2.06 0.29
Bootstrap standard errors. The table considers the impact of all PTAs active in the period 2001-2007, on each
country's prices and real income. Each line displays the impact for the ﬁrst named country, implied by its PTA with
the second country.
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Table 2: Price and real income impacts of PTAs (%), 2001-2007 (Cont'd)
Country Partner Import prices s.d. Production prices s.d. Real income s.d.
Ghana Egypt -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
Ghana Morocco -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
Hong-Kong China 0.82 0.06 1.57 0.12 0.75 0.07
Indonesia China -0.03 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.01
Jordan Egypt -0.07 0.01 0.21 0.03 0.28 0.03
Jordan Morocco -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01
Jordan Tunisia -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.01
Jordan Lebanon -0.10 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.01
Jordan Syria -0.20 0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.20 0.03
Kenya South Africa -0.14 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.02
Korea Chile -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03
Lebanon Egypt -0.02 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.16 0.01
Lebanon Tunisia -0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00
Lebanon Morocco -0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Lebanon Jordan -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.01
Malaysia China -0.23 0.03 0.19 0.02 0.43 0.03
Malaysia Thailand -0.52 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.53 0.05
Mexico Colombia -0.00 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01
Mexico Bolivia 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Morocco Egypt -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.02
Morocco Ghana -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Morocco Jordan -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01
Morocco Lebanon -0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Morocco Syria -0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01
Morocco Turkey -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01
Morocco Tunisia -0.12 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.19 0.01
Morocco USA -0.45 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.52 0.01
Paraguay Bolivia -0.10 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.26 0.03
South Africa Kenya 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
South Africa Egypt 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Syria Egypt 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.01
Syria Jordan 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01
Syria Morocco 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Thailand Malaysia 0.32 0.06 0.76 0.07 0.44 0.03
Thailand China -0.01 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.30 0.02
Tunisia Egypt -0.06 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.02
Tunisia Turkey -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00
Tunisia Jordan -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00
Tunisia Lebanon -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Tunisia Morocco -0.11 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.01
Turkey EFTA 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02
Turkey Egypt -0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02
Turkey Morocco -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Turkey Tunisia -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
USA Chile 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00
USA Morocco 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Uruguay Brazil -0.05 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.24 0.02
Uruguay Bolivia -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.02
Uruguay Chile -0.22 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.35 0.02
Bootstrap standard errors. The table considers the impact of all PTAs active in the period 2001-2007, on each
country's prices and real income. Each line displays the impact for the ﬁrst named country, implied by its PTA with
the second country. 25
5.2 Did world trade become more or less discriminatory?
The results just presented document the impacts of preferential trade policy. This
represents only a share of overall trade policy, as many countries also implement
trade barriers reductions outside of trade agreements. This can take the form of
MFN tariﬀ reductions, of reductions of applied tariﬀs below the bound level (for
WTO members), or more generally of unilateral barrier reductions granted on non-
preferential imports. The theory predicts diﬀerent impacts from preferential versus
non-preferential tariﬀ reductions: preferential trade opening can be detrimental to
the country's welfare, if trade diversion prevails. Moreover, we expect multilateral
opening to be generally more beneﬁcial in real income terms, but less positive for
production prices, as it generally does not entail an easier access to partner countries'
markets.
At this point, we would like to know whether world trade tends to evolve rather
preferentially or multilaterally; and whether we can understand what factors lead
a country to opt rather for the preferential, or the multilateral option.
We start by examining this question at the level of national trade policies. For
each country in our model, we consider its unilateral trade policy - i.e., all changes
in its tariﬀ structure - and ask what would have been the impact all else equal.
Results in table 3 show contrasted proﬁles across countries. Out of the 42 coun-
tries we consider, 23 have had a trade policy that favored the preferential mode of
liberalization, in the sense that it made their trade grow faster with their preferential
partners. The other 19 countries have had a trade policy that oriented their trade
relatively more toward multilateralism.
The table also displays the real income impacts of each country's trade policy.
One observes, reassuringly, that most countries have implemented a policy that
yielded real income gains. In particular, this is the case also for countries that
mostly lead a preferential policy still obtained a positive gain from it, conﬁrming
that detrimental eﬀects due to diversion are generally small compared to the gains
of preferential opening. Thus, these results oﬀer a more contrasted picture of the
evolution of trade policy, than a casual look at the explosion of PTAs might sug-
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gest. Most countries implement preferential and multilateral trade barrier reductions
concurrently, with the relative importance of the two processes varying across coun-
tries. Results on real income eﬀects of these policies suggest that these countries
are choosing their trade policy in their best interest: there is no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence in the real income impacts of trade policies between the preferentialist and
multilateralist countries.22 The relative attractiveness of opening trade multilat-
erally or preferentially varies across countries with the structure of their trade, the
importance of trade diversion to be expected from signing a PTA, and the levels of
tariﬀs in the country and in its partners; this should result in diﬀerent trade policy
choices. Testing the optimality of these choices will be the objective of next section.
22Grouping countries by the sign of the relative trade growth of preferential over non-preferential
trade, we ﬁnd that the real income eﬀect of trade policy is .13% lower in the ﬁrst group (s.e. 0.63).
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Table 3: Trade and real income impacts of countries' trade policy
Trade growth (%) Trade policy impact (%) on
Preferential Non-pref. Real income
Morocco 14.59 -9.64 5.55
Bolivia 11.10 -4.01 2.41
Brazil 14.63 -0.28 1.19
Chile 4.69 -8.01 3.39
Algeria 3.77 -4.98 1.65
South Africa 6.40 -2.24 0.86
Argentina 4.96 -1.89 2.06
China 11.22 5.18 2.95
Tunisia 5.67 1.22 3.42
Malaysia -0.25 -4.56 3.10
Ghana 4.81 0.85 1.86
Indonesia 1.16 -2.18 0.38
Colombia 2.23 -0.20 0.81
Thailand 6.36 4.26 1.08
EFTA -0.50 -2.34 -0.93
Canada -0.08 -1.30 -0.19
Lebanon 0.47 -0.57 0.19
Japan 0.59 0.10 -0.02
Korea 1.63 1.15 0.21
Kenya -0.51 -0.90 4.53
EU 0.53 0.33 0.03
Venezuela 1.34 1.21 0.25
Ivory Coast -0.15 -0.02 -0.30
Syria -0.09 0.11 -0.03
Cameroon 0.08 0.42 0.07
Jordan 1.34 1.83 3.04
Congo -0.28 0.51 0.26
USA 0.11 1.03 0.03
Taiwan 0.75 1.93 1.63
Nigeria -0.04 1.29 8.71
Russia -3.65 -0.69 0.97
Israel -0.15 3.00 0.56
India 10.44 13.69 6.18
Senegal -3.33 0.22 -0.13
Ecuador -1.50 2.37 0.35
Uruguay -3.19 2.37 2.15
Turkey -1.24 4.61 0.21
Paraguay -4.99 2.42 1.64
Mexico 2.81 12.09 1.68
Egypt 4.68 17.93 4.78
This table considers the impact of each country's trade policy on its trade structure,
income, all else equal. Trade changes with preferential and non-preferential partners
are computed. Real income is the ratio of nominal income to the domestic aggregate
CES price index.
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Before this, we wish to ask whether world trade is becoming as a whole more
or less preferential, i.e. whether trade between PTA partners is growing faster or
slower than that with non-PTA partners. To examine this question, we perform
counterfactual estimation of the impact of the two processes separately: in other
words, we study two scenarios, one including all tariﬀ reductions between PTA part-
ners, the second including all other tariﬀ reductions, thus being the complementary
of the ﬁrst.
Table 4: Trade impacts of PTAs: treatment eﬀects
%change in world trade
PTAs non-PTAs Global
Non-preferential trade -0.96 2.49 0.31
Preferential trade 2.04 -0.41 1.06
Table 4 shows the results. If only preferential trade barrier reductions had been
implemented in 2001-2007, world trade would have increased by 2.04% between PTA,
while contracting by almost 1 percentage point among non-partners. Conversely,
allowing only non-preferential tariﬀ reductions would have resulted in an decrease
in the relative weight of preferential trade. What is interesting is that, overall,
tariﬀ changes in that period have made world trade more preferential than not:
preferential trade has grown by 1 percentage point, more than three times more
than non-preferential trade. This may be surprising given the balance between the
orientation of trade policies across countries, but results from the fact that a higher
number of large countries have implemented preference-oriented trade policies in
the period: the countries with preference-oriented policies represented 67% of total
world trade in 2001.
29
6 Do countries sign the most beneﬁcial PTAs?
We now use our model to examine the following questions: among all possible trade
agreements, how do countries choose the ones they sign? Which of the objectives
of increasing the country's real income level, or the level of its production prices, is
being best served by these choices? Finally, do they optimally choose between the
options of preferential and multilateral trade liberalization?
To answer these questions, we perform a simulation exercise in which we compute
the impacts, for each country in our sample, of all possible bilateral trade agreements
with each other country. We model these agreements as follows: the two countries
agree to reduce their tariﬀs to half the lowest of their two tariﬀs in each sector. This
is intended to capture the reciprocity that applies to most agreements.
Our approach here rests on several hypotheses. First, we assume that the content
of a PTA is suﬃciently constrained by rules, so that the proﬁle of tariﬀ reductions in
any prospective agreement, conditional on initial protection levels, can be predicted
with a relative degree of accuracy. The most prominent such rule is article XXIV,
paragraph 8b of the GATT (now WTO), which requires that in a PTA duties
and other restrictive regulations of commerce (...) are eliminated on substantially
all the trade between the constituent territories. In practice, this means that two
countries may not sign a partial agreement, which would cover only a number
of selected sectors. Exceptions are , however, generally admitted to this rule, by
which a small number of product lines are being exempted from tariﬀ dismantlement
following negotiations between parties. The number of exceptions is generally small,
both because of the GATT/WTO rule and because of conﬂicting interests between
negotiating governments, as each country attempts to preserve protection for its
strategic industries, while trying to gain market access for all its exporters.
Second, our simulation exercise focuses on one speciﬁc aspect of PTA impacts:
the terms-of-trade eﬀects of preferential liberalization. Potential determinants of
trade policy also include economic factors not accounted for in our framework: in
particular specialization gains; as well as non-economic factors. For example, PTAs
may favor, or be facilitated by, political links and alliances between partners.
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Regarding economic determinants, our hypothesis is that terms-of-trade eﬀects
captured in our model constitute the most immediate eﬀects of changing trade barri-
ers; while specialization or productivity gains may take longer to materialize. Assum-
ing that governments have a short-term horizon, one can thus expect terms-of-trade
eﬀects to play a role in their decisions. In order to test that our results are not
driven by a correlation between these two components of PTA gains, we will per-
form robustness checks where variables capturing specialization gains are included
as controls in our regressions.
As for political determinants, we do not observe them. Our working assumption
is that such political links are not systematically correlated with our estimated price
impact, which are functions of trade costs and initial trade and protection levels.
Empirical speciﬁcation We model the probability of two countries signing a
PTA with the following functional form:
Pr[PTAij = 1] = F (β1.p̂
ij
j + β2.P̂
ij
j + β3.
̂(Yj/Pj)ML) (18)
where F is the logistic function; Pr[PTAij = 1] is the probability of a PTA being
signed between countries i and j; pˆ ijj and Pˆ
ij
j are the predicted impacts (relative
price changes) of a PTA with country i on country j's aggregate production price
pj and consumer price index Pj, respectively. (ˆYj/Pj)ML) represents the predicted
impact of a multilateral reduction of tariﬀ barriers for country i (expressed in relative
terms). This latter variable is intended to test whether the options of preferential
versus multilateral trade liberalization appear as substitutes in trade policy.
Prospective impacts pˆ ijj , Pˆ
ij
j are computed by starting from the observed level
of protection for all countries in our model in 2001, and simulating the impact of all
potential bilateral PTAs between any pair countries, while maintaining status quo
on all other trade barriers. PTAs are modeled as described at the beginning of this
section. (ˆYj/Pj)ML) is computed as the result of a multilateral opening of country
j's trade, modeled as a uniform cut of 50% on all tariﬀs barriers. The dependent
variable is a binary indicator of a PTA being signed between two countries after
2001.
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In alternative speciﬁcations, we rearrange this functional form as:
Pr[PTAij = 1] = F (β
′
1.p̂
ij
j + β
′
2.
̂(Yj/Pj)ij + β3. ̂(Yj/Pj)ML) (19)
which is equivalent if one recalls that, in the model, national income is the sum
of production prices multiplied by ﬁxed volumes : Yj =
∑
k p
k
jQ
k
j . This expression
allows to measure with β′2, the impact of expected real income gains on the prob-
ability of signing; while β′1 tests whether the impact on production price has any
explanatory power, after controlling for real income.
Results are shown in table 5. These results indicate, reassuringly, that the real
income gains that a country can expect from signing a bilateral PTA inﬂuence trade
policy in the right direction, increasing the probability of signing the agreement. It
also shows that the potential gains from opening multilaterally decrease the prob-
ability of signing a PTA: this indicates that countries with higher expected gains
from multilateral opening (due to e.g. more diversiﬁed trade across partners, and/or
higher average distance from trade partners) tend to engage less in preferential deals.
Decomposing the real income gains from PTAs into production prices on one
hand, and domestic aggregate price index impacts on the other (column 2) reveals
that these two variables do not carry the same weight in explaining trade policy.
The relative gains in production prices have an impact on the probability of signing
which are more than two times that of consumer price gains. This diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant and robust across speciﬁcations.
Column 4 further decomposes the gains from multilateral opening into their
production price and consumer price index components. The speciﬁcation in col.
5 uses country ﬁxed eﬀects, which control for the gains from multilateral opening
(invariant across partner countries) as well as for other potential factors impacting
PTA choices at the level of countries. These may relate to e.g. countries' size,
technology level, trade sophistication, which may aﬀect the gains from PTAs through
channels not accounted for in our model. Our main result, the larger impact of
producer gains over real income gains is holding in these speciﬁcations.
Table 6 tests the relevance of our measures of PTA eﬀects for explaining trade
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policy. In a seminal paper, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) develop a model of trade
which they use to derive a list of determinants of the potential gains from a PTA;
they then show that this list allows to correcly predict a number of the agreements
which were actually signed. Their model includes several dimensions of the gains
from PTAs, including specialization gains. By contrast, our approach is restricted to
more speciﬁc gains from PTAs, namely terms-of-trade gains; but we measure these
gains structurally. To test if our model adds some elements to ther understanding
of countries' trade policy, we run in table 6 regressions including the two lists of
variables.
Natural is a dummy for two countries being on the same continent. It captures
the gains from singing PTAs with so-called `natural partners', yielding higher gains
because of the more intense trade relations. Remote is a proxy measure of the
distance of two partners from the rest of the world countries, distance which increases
the PTA gains as diversion eﬀects are reduced. Finally, drgdp is a measure of the
gap in income levels between two countries and captures the similarity between two
economies.
Results show that although these variables have some power to explain PTAs,
they do not exhaust the determinants of countries' trade policy; in particular, our
measures of PTA price impacts remain signiﬁcant.
Finally, table 7 introduces a measure of the losses faced by a country if one
of its trade partners engages with a PTA with a third country. Baldwin (1993)
has proposed that contagion or domino eﬀects may explain the proliferation
of preferential agreements, as trade diversion from PTAs creates an incentive for
non-members to join existing agreements, or to form new ones. Here we test this
hypothesis by using a proxy measure of the loss to third countries: for each pair (A,B)
of countries, we compute the real income changes for A in scenarios where B signs
an agreement with a third country. These changes are negative, due to diversion.
We take the maximum loss incurred by A across all potential PTAs signed by B, and
use this as a proxy measure of the diversion threat. This measure is introduced
in our speciﬁcation in column 1, and decomposed in column 2 into the production
and price index components. Results indicate that the magnitude of this potential
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loss relates to the probability of signing an agreement, which tends to conﬁrm the
contagion hypothesis. Column 3 we build the PTA net impacts on prices, deﬁned
as the impact of signing an agreement, minus the loss in the case no agreement is
signed and the partner country engages in another PTA. The larger imp
Table 5: Determinants of PTA signing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pr[PTA = 1]
Real income impact of bilateral PTA 0.63a 0.63a 0.81a
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14)
PTA impact on production prices 1.42a 0.79c 1.44a 1.32b
(0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.52)
PTA impact on domestic price index -0.63a -0.63a
(0.10) (0.10)
Real income impact of multilateral opening -0.25a -0.24a -0.24a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
ML opening: prod. prices -0.33
(0.26)
ML opening: domestic price index 0.24a
(0.06)
Country ﬁxed-eﬀects yes
Observations 1722 1722 1722 1722 1148
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.136
Standard errors in parentheses.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
Logit regression on the probability of a PTA being signed between two countries in or after 2001.
Impact of each PTA on production f.o.b. prices and on the domestic price index (CES price index)
are used in % variation. They are computed at sector level, then aggregated consistently with the
model structure. See text for the deﬁnition of PTAs in the simulation exercise.
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Table 6: Determinants of PTAs: robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Pr[PTA = 1]
PTA impact: production prices 1.21b 1.21b 1.17b
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
PTA impact: domestic price index -0.64a -0.64a -0.57a
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Real income impact of multilateral opening -0.24a -0.25a -0.24a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Natural 0.49b 0.50b 0.56a
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Remote -0.15 -0.15
(0.54) (0.54)
Drgdp 0.09
(0.06)
Observations 1722 1722 1722
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.062 0.065
Standard errors in parentheses.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
Regressions in this table add to the former speciﬁcation used in table 5 the determinants of PTAs
as identiﬁed in Baier and Bergstrand (2004). Natural is 1 if the two countries are on the same
continent. Remote is the average distance of the two partners to other countries outside the pair.
Drgdp is the absolute value of the diﬀerence of the log of real GDPs of the two partners.
35
Table 7: Determinants of PTAs: diversion eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Pr[PTA = 1]
Real income impact of bilateral PTA 0.47a 0.49a
(0.12) (0.13)
Diversion: real income impact -6.82a
(2.49)
Diversion: production prices -4.33a
(1.31)
Diversion: domestic prices 0.14
(3.45)
Production prices: net impact 1.36a
(0.39)
Domestic prices: net impact -0.59a
(0.10)
Real income impact of multilateral opening -0.24a -0.22a -0.23a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 1722 1722 1722
Pseudo R2 0.060 0.065 0.060
Standard errors in parentheses.
c p<0.1, b p<0.05, a p<0.01
Regressions in this table add estimates of the potential losses by diversion faced by
one country if the partner country implements another PTA with a third country.
These impacts are decomposed into eﬀects on production prices, domestic CES price
index and overall real income impact. Net impacts are the diﬀerence between the
impact of signing a PTA, and the impact if the partner country signs with a third
country.
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7 Conclusion
What determines trade policy has been a recurrent question in the literature. In
this paper we have proposed an original approach to it, based on observing trade
policies in the data and looking at the implied trade and income eﬀects. First, we
looked at all tariﬀ changes implemented by world countries during 2001-2007, and
used a general equilibrium model to compute the implied impacts on trade patterns,
and on country real GDP and welfare levels. Although simple, our model essentially
captures terms-of-trade eﬀects of preferential and multilateral trade liberalization,
thus allowing to quantify trade creation and diversion eﬀects. This exercise reveals
that both preferential and multilateral liberalizations are being implemented con-
currently by most world countries; overall, about half the countries in our sample
have been running a trade policy more multilateral than preferential, thus reducing
distorsions in their tariﬀ structure. Next, we found tthe choice of trade policy to be
strongly related to both producer and consumer interests, with the former having a
weight about two times larger. In contrast to previous estimates in the literature,
this result shoows the presence of important distorsions in the setting of trade pol-
icy. It suggests that the excessive weight put on market access gains leads countries
to exhibit a bias in favor of preferential trade liberalization, despite larger expected
gains from multilateral opening.
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Appendices
A Estimation of sector elasticities
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Table 8: Sector elasticities estimates
Sectors Coeﬀ. std. Obs. Sectors Coeﬀ. std. Obs.
ISIC error ISIC error
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
101 -3.75 2.88 1602 251 -5.97 0.55 7833
102 -4.1 2.52 1250 252 -7.98 0.58 8390
103 -4.1 2.52 1250 261 -8.06 0.63 6871
111 -1.24 0.22 8025 269 -3.22 0.77 7651
112 -0.33 0.29 5584 271 -4.19 0.78 7634
113 -1.95 0.26 7839 272 -7.15 0.93 7097
121 -0.86 0.48 2056 281 -4.63 0.73 5981
122 -0.21 0.29 4697 289 -4.19 0.58 8885
131 -10.8 2.41 3924 291 -6.31 0.72 9006
132 -10.8 2.41 3924 292 -5.46 1.26 8967
141 -5.96 0.99 4321 293 -5.14 0.59 6367
142 -4.96 1.23 5356 300 -6.8 1.44 7819
151 -1.93 0.24 8811 311 -6.48 0.99 7236
152 -1.34 0.31 4312 312 -5.3 0.83 7147
153 -1.03 0.17 5942 313 -7.7 0.83 5818
154 -0.88 0.21 8059 314 -4.5 0.75 5359
155 -0.34 0.11 5826 315 -4.02 0.59 6313
160 -0.66 0.21 3794 319 -4.43 0.84 6734
171 -2.76 0.58 7772 321 -9.44 1.3 6341
172 -3.66 0.51 8150 322 -0.76 0.62 6548
173 -2.72 0.59 7144 323 -3 0.65 6968
181 -2.8 0.38 8400 331 -5.71 1 8203
182 -1.16 0.87 2448 332 -2.09 0.82 5801
191 -4.98 0.57 6929 333 -2.53 0.83 4508
192 -3.6 0.48 6390 341 -3.96 0.47 6633
200 -1.58 0.5 5542 342 -2.84 0.63 4572
201 -4.13 1.1 5112 343 -6.94 0.67 7262
202 -3.62 0.56 7099 351 -4.1 1.4 3596
210 -7 0.69 7445 352 -12.97 2.01 2571
221 -6.71 0.74 6998 353 -7.99 1.66 4541
222 -4.48 0.59 5799 359 -2.56 0.56 5032
231 -4.75 4.03 1164 361 -5.07 0.49 7348
232 -3.69 0.99 6004 369 -0.79 0.21 8759
233 -5.19 2.59 1713 372 -2.38 1.23 1836
241 -8.77 0.87 9059 500 -1.2 0.6 4370
242 -1.31 0.43 9535 742 -6.63 3.27 1366
243 -4.47 1.05 4772 749 -9.91 1.57 1763
921 -3.27 0.76 4362
Notes: Estimation of sector-level CES demand elasticities based on equa-
tion (2). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. Estimations use importer-year and exporter-year ﬁxed-eﬀects. The
table reports coeﬃcients obtained on the tariﬀ variable, which corresponds
to the factor 1− σ in the model. R2 vary in the range of 0.6-0.86.
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